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SUMMARY
Efforts to develop an empirically derived typology of a major component of the implicit
aggressive personality are described.  A variety of samples (from both student and work
populations) completed the Conditional Reasoning Test for Aggression (CRT-A; James,
McIntyre, Glisson, Bowler, & Mitchell, 2004; James et al., 2005).  Individual scores on the CRT-
A were analyzed utilizing cluster analytic methodology in order to develop a typology of the key
defense mechanisms used by the implicit aggressive personality.  The resulting clusters were
analyzed using affirmation analysis (Feild & Schoenfeldt, 1975) to test the reliability of each.  A
useful system for classifying the implicit aggressive personality resulted from this endeavor.  It is
expected that both scientists and practitioners can use this typology as a means for classifying
aggressive individuals.  Implications include the development of an organizing framework
facilitating scientific communication in research on the aggressive personality as well as a
classification system for organizations to identify those applicants and incumbents that might be




What research exists on the aggressive personality has primarily looked at aggression as a
criterion, namely aggressive behavior (e.g., Citrome & Volavka, 2001; Kudryavtsev & Ratinova,
1999; Ramirez & Andreu, 2003).  The unconscious causes underlying aggression have been
overlooked by many personality theorists.  The latent mental structures and processes that cause
aggression – that is, the implicit1 personality – have been largely ignored.  Furthermore, the
psychological community has given little attention to the task of identifying a meaningful and
replicable typology of aggressive personalities if indeed such exists.  Typologies of aggressive
behavior have been developed (e.g., Citrome & Volavka, 2001; Kudryavtsev & Ratinova, 1999;
Varela & Braña, 1991), but there are no known typologies of the unconscious mental structure
and processes that cause aggression to occur.  Related to this is the fact that no researchers have
created a personality typology utilizing an implicit personality measure (e.g., Thematic
Apperception Test [TAT]).
This paper details efforts to develop an empirically derived typology of a major
component of the implicit aggressive personality in non-clinical, student and organizational
populations.  The reason for creating such a typology is to better understand how the implicit
aggressive personality is structured.  In the text that follows, the theory and methodology used to
construct the typology is described, as is the classification system itself and its potential practical
utility.
                                                 
1 “Implicit” is operationally defined here as “not accessible to introspection” (see Greenwald &
Banaji, 1995; McClelland, Koestner, & Weinberger, 1989; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Winter,
John, Stewart, Klohnen, & Duncan, 1998).  The terms implicit, unconscious, and latent will be
used interchangeably throughout the paper.
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The Implicit Aggressive Personality
Perhaps the lack of focus in studying aggression stems from the difficulty in measuring it
as a personality construct.  It is relatively easy to take a post-hoc look at an individual’s behavior
and determine whether or not it can be classified as aggressive.  It is an entirely different thing to
be able to measure the causes behind why people behave aggressively.  I shall explore this issue
by examining the implicit personality of aggressive individuals to see if there are patterns to the
ways in which they justify their aggressive behaviors and, if so, to investigate how these patterns
of justification both differ and correspond.
The motive to aggress.  The motive to aggress has conventionally been defined as a desire
to fight, to forcefully overcome opposition, to avenge a wrong, to punish another, and to attack
another with the aim of hurting or killing them (Murray, 1938).  Individuals with strong motives
to aggress are predisposed to react to frustrating situations (e.g., solitary events like being
rejected for a job as well as recurring conditions like not being accepted by peers) with anger and
desire to exact harm on the alleged source of the frustration (Baron & Richardson, 1994;
Berkowitz, 1993).  This predisposition to respond to certain situations aggressively is often due
to erroneous framing and reasoning that serves to justify one’s aggressive behaviors (James &
Mazerolle, 2002; James, McIntyre, Glisson, Bowler, & Mitchell, 2004).
Like many motives, the motive to aggress resides almost exclusively below the surface of
consciousness (James & Rentsch, 2004), thus making it unavailable to introspection.  Further,
the motive to aggress is protected by defensive processes (see Westen, 1998).  Another defining
feature is the fact that it conflicts with the motive to hold a favorable view of the self (see
Baumeister, Campbell, Krueger, & Vohs, 2003).  This conflict is what oftentimes arouses the
aforementioned unconscious defensive processes [“defense mechanisms” (see Baumeister, Dale,
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& Sommer, 1998; Cramer, 2000)] that make possible the expression of aggression while
concurrently protecting the individual’s self-worth.
Defense mechanisms, rationalization, and aggression. Defense mechanisms are processes
employed by individuals to defend against the threatening implications of events that endanger
one’s preferred view of the self (Baumeister, Dale, & Sommer, 1998).  Freud is the most cited
progenitor of defense mechanisms, despite the fact that he wasn’t the first to propose the idea.
Freud proposed a number of defense mechanisms throughout his life’s work (e.g., 1915/1961a,
1923/1961c, 1926/1961d), although he never provided a definitive list.  Anna Freud (1936) did
endeavor to classify defense mechanisms by dividing them into four processes: displacement,
projection, rationalization, and reaction formation.  Aggressive individuals potentially employ
each of these unconsciously, depending on both the situation and individual differences in the
implicit aggressive personality.  The key defense mechanism for individuals with an implicit
aggressive personality is rationalization (James, 1998; James et al., 2004, 2005).  Rationalization
is defined as the use of presumably reasonable explanations to justify behaviors that are
unknowingly caused by unconscious, unacceptable, and/or unwanted motives (Baumeister,
Smart, & Boden, 1996; Westen & Gabbard, 1999).
Personality researchers have theorized that defense mechanisms operate unconsciously to
protect individuals from understanding the genuine causes of their aggressive behavior: the
motive to aggress (Bersoff, 1999; Cramer, 2000; James & Mazerolle, 2002; Westen & Gabbard,
1999).  Theorists have emphasized the importance of assessing these implicit processes via
indirect measures (i.e., measures that assess the extent to which individuals rely on unconscious
processes like defense mechanisms).  Implicit measures must inherently be indirect because they
are evaluating biases that operate unconsciously.  To provide a contrast, most personality
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measures (e.g., self-report) assess explicit processes.  That is, the measures evaluate aspects of
the personality that are accessible to awareness.  One cannot fill out a self-report measure that
assesses the extent to which they rely on the defense mechanism of rationalization in their
normal, everyday reasoning.  It will be a futile waste of time.  It should be clear that to measure
implicit processes such as defense mechanisms, “indirect measurements are theoretically
essential” (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995, p. 5).
As a response to this need for valid indirect measures of the implicit personality and its
inner workings, James (1998) proposed and developed a measurement system termed
“conditional reasoning.”  One of the personality constructs for which James and colleagues
developed a test was aggression (James & McIntyre, 2000; James et al., 2004, 2005).
Implicit Aggression and Conditional Reasoning
Conditional reasoning indirectly assesses the implicit cognitive processes that are
involved as aggressive people attempt to justify behaving aggressively (James, 1998; James &
Mazerolle, 2002).  Individuals with an aggressive personality clearly do not view their
aggressive actions objectively.  Instead, they appear to rely on a unique set of implicit biases to
justify their aggressive behavior.
Due to space constraints, I refer the reader to articles by James and colleagues (2004,
2005) for descriptions of the theoretical basis for conditional reasoning as well as empirical tests
of the Conditional Reasoning Test for Aggression (CRT-A).  To summarize briefly, the CRT-A
is a psychometrically valid and reliable test for measuring an individual’s implicit motive to
aggress.  Further description of the CRT-A will appear in the Method section.
Justification mechanisms.  The conditional reasoning measurement system mainly
focuses on the defense mechanism of rationalization.  Specifically, James (1998) posited that
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self-protective biases unconsciously shape reasoning so that individuals perceive their aggressive
actions as justified.  These implicit cognitive biases to reason in ways that enhance the rational
appeal of alternative motivations (to act aggressively, for example) (James, 1998) are termed
“justification mechanisms.”  They are the specific enablers behind aggressive individuals’ self-
deceptive thinking that their behavior is rational.  An example will help to further elucidate the
concept of justification mechanisms.
Relative to nonaggressive individuals, aggressive persons are more likely to frame social
norms as repressive and restrictive of free will.  This tendency to view social norms as
restraining is referred to as the Social Discounting Bias (James et al., 2005; see also Finnegan,
1997; Loeber & Stouthamer-Loeber, 1998; Millon, 1990).  This bias promotes the rationalization
of aggression via a sense of reactance (James, 1998; see also James & Mazerolle, 2002).  That is,
a bias to frame social norms as restrictive of free will promotes a sense of opposition, which is
then used by aggressive individuals to justify their aggressive behaviors as a means of liberating
themselves from oppressive social customs and as ways to employ their innate right to freedom
of expression.
If social norms were truly repressive and restrictive of free will, then the use of
aggression in order to free oneself from the restrictive world would be rational.  However, in
general (at least in the U.S.), social norms are, on the average, established to be non-repressive
and to allow freedom of expression.  Thus, the feelings of reactance reflect an implicit
(unconscious) predilection to see restriction when it is not present.  The justification for
aggressive behavior is therefore illusory and self-deceptive.
The Social Discounting Bias is one of six justification mechanisms (JMs) posited by
James and colleagues as fundamental in creating an erroneous sense of rationality to aggressive
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acts.  Table 1 presents a brief description of each JM and how each promotes the rationalization
of aggression.  The conditional reasoning system attempts to measure the extent to which
individuals tend to rely on these implicit biases to justify their motive-fulfilling behavior, thus
increasing the perceived rationality of behaving aggressively (James, 1998).
The use of justification mechanisms.  This study seeks to answer the following questions:
Which justification mechanisms (JMs) do aggressive individuals tend to favor?  Do different
aggressive individuals favor different JMs?  Are there identifiable patterns to the manner in
which aggressive individuals employ JMs?  Do these patterns help to identify empirically
distinguishable clusters?  If so, do these clusters make up a useful typology of the implicit
aggressive personality?  The goal of the current study is to answer each of these questions and, if
possible, present a practical classification system for the implicit aggressive personality.
There exists no theory regarding the pattern of use of justification mechanisms, nor are
there any theories regarding the organization or representation of JMs in the implicit personality.
As a result, there is no extant literature pertaining to the salient research questions in the current
paper.  However, since JMs have their theoretical roots in defense mechanisms (e.g.,
rationalization), it might be advantageous to examine theories regarding the organization of
defense mechanisms in the implicit personality.  This could provide insight into the potential
structure of the implicit aggressive personality.
Weinberger (1998) suggested that there are different patterns to the manner in which
individuals employ defense mechanisms.  He based this premise on theoretical work by Laughlin
(1963), wherein the researcher argued that defense mechanisms often operate in concert and in a
potentially endless variety of patterns.  “Dozens of defense mechanisms have been proposed, and
a host of different combinations may theoretically be employed within as well as across
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Table 1:  Justification Mechanisms for Aggression (James et al., 2004, 2005)
(1) Hostile Attribution Bias.  A propensity to
sense hostility and perhaps even danger in the
behavior of others (see Crick & Dodge, 1994;
Dodge & Coie, 1987).  The alarm and feelings of
peril engendered by this heightened sensitivity to
threat trigger a concern for self-protection (James
& Mazerolle, 2002).  Apprehension about self-
preservation enhances the rational appeal of self-
defense, thus promoting the self-deceptive
illusion that aggression is justified (see James et
al., 2005 for a model of this process).
(4) Victimization by Powerful Others Bias.  A
bias to see inequity and exploitation in the actions
of powerful others (e.g., parents, teachers,
supervisors, the Internal Revenue Service; see
Averill, 1993; Finnegan, 1997; Toch, 1993).  The
ensuing perceptions of oppression and
victimization stimulate feelings of anger and
injustice.  This sets the stage for rationalizing
aggression as a legitimate strike against
oppression and a justified correction of prejudice
and injustice.
(2) Potency Bias.  A proclivity to focus thoughts
about social interactions on dominance versus
submissiveness.  The actions of others pass
through a perceptual prism primed to distinguish
(a) strength, assertiveness, dominance, daring,
fearlessness, and power from (b) weakness,
impotence, submissiveness, timidity, compliance,
and cowardice (Anderson, 1994; Gay, 1993;
James & Mazerolle, 2002; Millon, 1990).
Fixations on dominance versus submissiveness
generate rationalizations that aggression is an act
of strength or bravery that gains respect from
others.  Failing to act aggressively shows
weakness.
(5) Derogation of Target Bias.  This bias consists
of an unconscious tendency to characterize those
one wishes to make (or has made) targets of
aggression as evil, immoral, or untrustworthy (cf.
Wright & Mischel, 1987).  To infer or associate
such traits with a target makes the target more
deserving of aggression.
(3) Retribution Bias.  A predilection to
determine that retaliation is more rational than
reconciliation (cf. Bradbury & Fincham, 1990;
Dodge, 1986; Laursen & Collins, 1994).  This
bias is often stimulated by perceptions of
wounded pride, challenged self-esteem, or
disrespect (cf. Baumeister et al., 1996).
Aggression in response to the humiliation and
anger of being demeaned is rationalized as
justified restoration of honor and respect.
(6) Social Discounting Bias.  A proclivity to
frame social norms as repressive and restrictive
of free will (James et al., 2005; see also Finnegan,
1997; Loeber & Stouthamer-Loeber, 1998;
Millon, 1990).   Perceptions of societal
restrictiveness promote feelings of reactance.
These feelings furnish a foundation for justifying
socially deviant behaviors such as aggression as
ways to liberate oneself from repressive social
customs and to exercise one’s lawful right to
freedom of expression.
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situations” (Weinberger, 1998, p. 1062).  This indicates that there might be a similar mechanism
operating in the employment of justification mechanisms and lends credence to the necessity of
looking for different patterns of JM employment by aggressive individuals.
No empirical research has been conducted that examines the patterns of how people favor
JMs, which could lead to a better understanding of how JMs are represented or organized in the
cognitive structure.  As a result, the current research will explore an uninvestigated research
domain by utilizing conditional reasoning (James, 1998) and its measure of aggression (James et
al., 2004, 2005) to determine the patterns of how individuals classified as aggressive favor the
use of justification mechanisms.
Toward a Typology
The psychological mechanism that drives an individual to commit an aggressive act at
work (e.g., stealing office supplies, sabotaging a coworker’s presentation, showing up late, lying
to a boss) can be – and often is – quite different for different individuals.  Put in broader terms,
“superficially similar behaviors can have quite different psychological determinants and
functions” (Weinberger, 1998, p. 1063).  A typology of the major justification mechanisms
operating in the implicit aggressive personality will provide a means to elucidate these
differences.
Typologies of aggression have been developed for clinical populations (often using the
DSM-IV classification as the criterion; e.g., Citrome & Volavka, 2001) as well as for criminal
(Kudryavtsev & Ratinova, 1999) and delinquent populations (Varela & Braña, 1991), but this
researcher failed to find any typologies that have been developed for non-clinical, non-criminal
adult populations.  Further, no studies have attempted to cluster aggressive personalities based on
implicit processes such as justification mechanisms.  However, as mentioned above, research by
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James and colleagues (2004, 2005) has suggested that aggressive individuals employ certain
justification mechanisms in order to rationalize their aggressive tendencies.  These justification
mechanisms provide an organized and concise method in which to examine and test a potential
typology.
There are multiple possibilities regarding the organization of the key justification
mechanisms in the implicit aggressive personality.  One option is that the personality is clustered
into five independent subtypes, each of which corresponds to a specific justification mechanism
(see Table 1).  In other words, the personality of aggressive individuals can be classified
according to the extent to which individuals rely on a specific justification mechanism to
rationalize their aggressive tendencies.
Each justification mechanism is represented in the above possibility except the
Derogation of Target Bias.  An exploratory factor analysis (EFA) of the conditional reasoning
problems was conducted to determine their latent structure (James et al., 2005).  The EFA
revealed five factors.  The Derogation of Target Bias was not represented in the five factors.  As
such, James and colleagues noted that they would likely drop this justification mechanism in the
future.  Thus, it is not expected to be an independent component in the personality structure of
aggressive individuals.
Another possibility is that the same justification mechanisms work in concert for different
clusters of aggressive individuals.  For example, one cluster might consist of individuals that
utilize theoretically related JMs (e.g., Potency Bias and Victimization by Powerful Others Bias),
another might consist solely of individuals that utilize one JM (e.g., Social Discounting Bias),
and yet another might consist of individuals that use three JMs (e.g., Hostile Attribution Bias,
Potency Bias, and Retribution Bias).  Thus, the typology could be composed of clusters that are
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defined by a single JM working alone, two JMs operating jointly, and/or more than two JMs
working together.
There might not be any differentiation among individuals that are characterized as
implicitly aggressive.  This will occur if individuals with an implicit aggressive personality all
arrive at an aggressive score on the CRT-A via essentially the same path.  Data analyses will thus
not result in various unique clusters.  Instead, there will likely be one large cluster that does not
distinguish between subgroups of individuals with different implicit aggressive personalities.
A final alternative is that implicitly aggressive persons will not employ the justification
mechanisms in a manner that will be captured by the classification techniques.  Thus, there
simply might not be any discernable pattern to the way individuals respond to the CRT-A.  If this
is the case, then cluster analysis will reveal a number of clusters that cannot be appropriately
labeled because they do not indicate subgroups that coincide with theory.  Consequently, the
individuals will likely demonstrate use of various justification mechanisms, with essentially no
pattern to their use.
The present research endeavor seeks to determine how the implicit aggressive personality
is organized by analyzing the manner in which aggressive individuals use justification
mechanisms to rationalize their engagement in aggressive behaviors.  The objective is to develop
a useful typology of the major component of the implicit aggressive personality (i.e., justification





Four samples (n = 1,603) from diverse populations (e.g., work and student) completed the
Conditional Reasoning Test for Aggression (CRT-A; James et al., 2004, 2005).  The samples are
described in Table 2.  Please note that sixty-four subjects did not complete the entire CRT-A.  As
a result, their responses and overall scores were removed from the analysis, thus leaving n =
1,539.
Table 2: Description of Samples
Sample n Gender  (%) Race (%)
Undergraduate students from a






New package handlers in an
international organization that
specializes in the rapid delivery of






Members of a pool for temporary,
entry-level jobs in local businesses in





Employees of a major credit card
company (mean age N/A) 585 N/A N/A
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Measures
The conditional reasoning measurement system. James (1998) developed an indirect
procedure for measuring the unconscious cognitive processes of individuals.  This indirect
measurement system, labeled “conditional reasoning”, taps into the latent, consistent reasoning
biases that individuals use to justify motive-based behaviors (e.g., aggression).
Conditional reasoning test for aggression (CRT-A).  Designed to measure individual
differences in proclivities to use specific types of implicit biases in reasoning, the CRT-A (James
et al., 2004, 2005) serves as the measure of implicit readiness to aggress in the current study.
The aforementioned implicit biases of interest consist of unconscious attempts to justify behavior
engendered by the motive to aggress.  These biases are what were referred to as justification
mechanisms in the Introduction section of this paper (see Table 1).
As noted, the CRT-A assesses whether an individual is unconsciously disposed to
rationalize behavior that is caused by the motive to aggress.  To assess these implicit proclivities,
respondents are given premises (e.g., logical arguments, explanations, assumptions, events) built
around themes known to trigger justification mechanisms by aggressive individuals.  They are
then provided with an inductive reasoning task in which they are asked to reason from the
provided premises to a reasonable conclusion.  This task is quite similar to those found in
standardized tests of critical reasoning skills.  Alternative conclusions are supplied, and
respondents are asked to identify which one of the conclusions most reasonably follows from the
premises, given that more than one conclusion may appear reasonable.  To enhance the face
validity of the task, and to protect the indirect nature of measurement, the alternative conclusions
are embedded within a set of four conclusions.  Two of the conclusions are clearly illogical and
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almost always rejected by respondents.  One conclusion is designed to appeal to aggressive
respondents, and another is targeted at nonaggressive individuals.
The CRT-A contains 25 questions – 22 conditional reasoning problems that measure
aggression, and three critical reasoning problems that are not scored.  The critical reasoning
problems are included only to create the impression of a critical reasoning test.  Each conditional
reasoning problem has four response options – one aggressive alternative, one nonaggressive
alternative, and two illogical alternatives.  Respondents are given a “+1” for every aggressive
alternative they select, a “0” for every illogical alternative they select, and a “-1” for every
nonaggressive alternative they select.  These scores are then added up within subjects to provide
a composite score for each individual.  The composite scores are then linearly transformed (to
maintain the between-subject distribution) into a scale that has a mean of 6.0 and a standard
deviation of 1.67.  High scores on the CRT-A are thus obtained by selecting a relatively large
number of aggressive response alternatives to solve the conditional reasoning problems.
Scores on the CRT-A are interpreted in terms of individual differences in respondents'
implicit cognitive readiness to aggress.  Numerous validity studies conducted by James and
colleagues have determined that individuals with high scores on the CRT-A have a significantly
greater probability of engaging in aggressive acts than individuals with low or moderate scores
(e.g., the average uncorrected validity for 11 studies is .44).  An illustrative conditional reasoning
problem is presented in Table 3.
Procedure
Please note that all aspects of the procedure are designed to maintain the guise that the
Conditional Reasoning Test for Aggression is a measure of critical reasoning skills.  It is of
utmost importance that participants think that they are taking a reasoning test, not a personality
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Table 3: Illustrative Conditional Reasoning Problem
The old saying, “an eye for an eye,” means that if someone hurts you, then you should hurt that
person back.  If you are hit, then you should hit back.  If someone burns your house, then you
should burn that person’s house.
Which of the following is the biggest problem with the “eye for an eye” plan?
a. It tells people to “turn the other cheek.”
b. It offers no way to settle a conflict in a friendly manner.
c. It can be used only at certain times of the year.
d. People have to wait until they are attacked before they can strike.
assessment.  Recall that justification mechanisms (JMs) are, by definition, inaccessible to
introspection.  In order for the CRT-A to properly assess the JMs underlying an unconscious
readiness to rationalize aggression, participants must think that they are taking a reasoning test.
It is only under this condition that the measure is able to properly assess the salient components
of the implicit aggressive personality.
All participants completed the CRT-A under supervision.  Participants were given 25
minutes to complete the measure.  While reading the directions, supervisors instructed the
participants to identify the one answer that is most logical for each question.
Analyses
Cluster analysis served as the data analytic tool for the development of the typology of
the implicit aggressive personality.  Affirmation analysis (Feild & Schoenfeldt, 1975) was used
to determine the reliability of the cluster solution.
Clustering techniques have shown to be effective in identifying natural groups in sets of
psychological data.  However, they have been criticized on many grounds (e.g., Aldenderfer &
Blashfield, 1984; Milligan & Cooper, 1987; Gordon, 1999).  The present research hoped to
overcome the noted limitations of cluster analysis by applying a rigorous analytical strategy to
15
the data.  This strategy entailed several steps.  First, the final cluster solution was determined via
two different clustering algorithms: (a) Ward’s (1963) agglomerative hierarchical clustering
method with squared Euclidean distance as the similarity measure and (b) k-means, an
optimization partitioning method also with squared Euclidean distance.  Next, affirmation
analysis (Field & Schoenfeldt, 1975) was performed on the resulting clusters in order to check
the reliability of the cluster analytic procedures.  All analyses were conducted using SPSS 11.0
for Mac OS X.
Cluster analysis.  Profiles were sorted with the goal of achieving typological
distinctiveness, replicability, and full coverage.  Distinctiveness ensures that individuals within
each cluster are maximally similar to one another and dissimilar to those in alternative clusters.
High replicability for independent subsets of the sample reduces the possibility that clusters
might emerge by chance, which in turn mitigates the likelihood that sampling error is influencing
the cluster solution.  Full coverage means that the typology is based on all representative cases in
the population and does not arbitrarily exclude any profiles during cluster formation.  Full
coverage is important for a typology that is intended to be representative (see Aldenderfer &
Blashfield, 1984; Blashfield & Draguns, 1976).  Ward's (1963) agglomerative hierarchical
procedure was determined to best satisfy these research goals (per Monte Carlo studies by
Bayne, Beauchamp, Begovich, & Kane, 1980; Milligan, 1980; and Overall, Gibson, & Novy,
1993).
Recall that the exploratory factor analysis of the conditional reasoning problems (James
et al., 2005) revealed a five-factor structure – each of the five factors loaded on a specific
justification mechanism (except for the Derogation of Target Bias).  This five-factor solution
provided the basis for how the subjects’ scores were to be used in the analyses.  An overall score
16
for each justification mechanism was calculated for each subject.  The cluster analysis based on
an agglomerative hierarchical procedure developed by Ward (1963) was then performed on the
1,539 subject scoring profiles (i.e., each subject’s overall score on each of the five justification
mechanisms was used to cluster subjects into groups).
Ward’s procedure uses distances as the metric.  The procedure starts with a disjointed set
of entities that are merged by certain rules into fewer yet more inclusive clusters until all are
combined into a conjoined set.  These rules are discussed in detail below.
Ward’s method produces calculations for the mean of each cluster for all variables.  The
squared Euclidean distance to the cluster mean is calculated for each case.  The distances are
summed and the clusters that are merged at each step are those that produce the smallest
increment in the sum of the squared within-cluster distances.  A more extensive description of
the procedure follows.
Squared Euclidean distance is geometric distance in multidimensional space.  It is
computed here as:
distance = ∑(xik – yjk)2
where x is the score for subject i on justification mechanism k, and y is the score for subject j on
justification mechanism k.
At the first step, when each case represented its own cluster, the distances between those
cases were defined by the chosen distance measure (i.e., squared Euclidean distance).  Once
several cases had been linked together, the distances between the new clusters were calculated
using Ward’s method, which provided an amalgamation rule to determine when two clusters
were sufficiently similar to be linked together.  Ward's method is distinct from all other methods
because it uses an analysis of variance approach to evaluate the distances between clusters.  In
17
short, it attempts to minimize the sum of squares of any two (hypothetical) clusters that can be
formed at each step.
It is necessary to determine the level that best reproduces the underlying structure.
Because virtually every clustering procedure (including Ward’s) provides little if any
information with regard to the number of clusters present in the data, a stopping rule or
procedure is required to select the optimal number of clusters.  A vast number of stopping rules
have been developed.  Milligan and Cooper (1985) conducted a Monte Carlo evaluation of 30
such stopping rule procedures.  Atlas and Overall (1994) later performed a comparative study of
Overall and Magee’s (1992) “higher-order clustering” stopping procedure with the stopping rule
deemed best by Milligan and Cooper, the Calinski & Harabasz (1974) index.  Results revealed
that, when using “real data,” the Overall and Magee stopping procedure is preferable.  Therefore,
“higher-order clustering” was used in the current study to determine the number of clusters
present in the data.
Higher-order clustering (Overall & Magee, 1992) entailed a multi-stage process.  First,
the 1,539 profiles were randomly partitioned into three mutually exclusive blocks of 513.
Ward's method (1963) was applied independently to the cases comprising each block and cluster
mean profiles were calculated for two- through eight-cluster solutions for each block.  Cluster
means derived from the three independent first-stage analyses were pooled and subjected to
second-stage clustering.  Specifically, a similarity matrix was constructed to impart full first-
stage history (cluster mean profiles, squared Euclidean distances, and within-cluster profile
frequency) and Ward's method was reapplied.  The highest cluster solution at which perfect
replication was achieved was determined to be optimal.  Furthermore, the solution was required
to make psychological sense in terms of parsimonious coverage of the data.
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After performing Ward’s hierarchical procedure, a k-means analysis was conducted in
which the number of clusters specified included the number obtained from the Ward procedure
plus and minus one and two clusters (e.g., if Ward’s procedure resulted in a five-cluster solution,
then a three-cluster, four-cluster, five-cluster, six-cluster, and seven-cluster solution was
specified for the k-means analysis).  In general, the k-means method is designed to produce
exactly k different clusters of greatest possible distinction.  The method can be contrasted from
Ward’s (1963) procedure in that it is a divisive method (versus agglomerative).
Computationally, the k-means clustering method begins with k random clusters, and then
moves objects between those clusters with the goal of minimizing variability within clusters and
maximizing variability between clusters.  The desired number of clusters was specified a priori.
A first pass of the data was conducted and initial cluster centroids were chosen.  The procedure
then iterated through the entire sample of cases and it grouped observations based on nearest
Euclidean distance to each cluster centroid.  At each iteration, cluster centroids changed.  The
procedure continued until cluster centroids did not shift.
Affirmation analysis.  Feild and Schoenfeldt (1975) noted that the groupings obtained via
Ward’s (1963) procedure are sometimes less than optimal.  Thus, they developed a two-part
procedure to be used in conjunction with Ward’s in order to address the deficiency and achieve
an optimal grouping of cases.  Termed affirmation analysis, the method (see below) serves both
as an estimate of the reliability of the cluster solutions obtained in the initial cluster analysis and
as a means to obtain a “‘cleaner’, more optimal assignment of subjects to subgroups” (Feild &
Schoenfeldt, 1975, p. 173).
Affirmation analysis entailed two steps.  First, the procedure checked the assignments of
the subjects to the groups and removed inappropriately classified subjects.  A discriminant
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analysis was then performed for the second step.  Based on this analysis, the incorrectly
classified subjects were reassigned and these reassignments were confirmed.  The objective was




A five-cluster solution was deemed most representative of the sample.  Moreover, it
satisfied all statistical requirements.  The profile of the first cluster indicated that it consisted of
the nonaggressive portion of the sample.  The profile of the four remaining clusters appeared to
correspond well with four of the five retained justification mechanisms (JMs) that are utilized by
aggressive individuals to enhance the rational appeal of their aggressive behavior.  This solution
supports the idea that the implicit aggressive personality is organized by justification mechanism,
and that individuals tend to rely on essentially one JM to rationalize their aggressive behavioral
manifestations.
The five-cluster solution initially resulted from the analyses that employed Ward’s (1963)
hierarchical agglomerative technique.  Further support for the robustness of this solution was
provided via the higher-order clustering technique and a k-means analysis.
The k-means analysis specified a three-cluster, four-cluster, five-cluster, six-cluster, and
seven-cluster solution.  Results revealed a 72% replication of the five-cluster solution obtained
from Ward’s agglomerative hierarchical procedure, thus suggesting that five types comprise the
optimal cluster solution.
Arguably the most important aspect of the data analyses was the affirmation analysis.
This two-step procedure served to estimate the reliability of the typology as well as “clean” the
typology by reassigning subjects considered to have initially been placed in the wrong subgroup.
Tables 4 through 10 present the critical output from the affirmation (i.e., discriminant) analysis.
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The discriminant analysis produced four significant discriminant functions, evidenced by
the significant eigenvalues and percentage of variance explained by each of the functions (see
Table 4).  Table 5 demonstrates, with Wilks’ Lambda and chi-square, that group differences are
significant before and after derivation of the discriminant functions.  Thus, all four of the
discriminant functions that were derived are statistically significant and useful.
Table 4: Eigenvalues
Function Eigenvalue % of Variance Cumulative % CanonicalCorrelation
1 1.395 43.6 43.6 .763
2 .964 30.1 73.7 .701
3 .519 16.2 89.9 .584
4 .325 10.1 100 .495
Table 5: Wilks’ Lambda
Test of
Function(s) Wilks’ Lambda Chi-square df Sig.
1 through 4 .106 3445.6 20 .000
2 through 4 .253 2106.8 12 .000
3 through 4 .497 1072.1 6 .000
4 .755 431.4 2 .000
The Social Discounting Bias had the highest loading on function 1 (c = .946; see Table 6)
and is by far the most important contributor to determining scores on that function.  The structure
coefficient for this JM on function 1 is .938 (see Table 7), providing further evidence that the
bias and the function are closely related.
Inspection of the loadings for function 2 shows a high positive loading (c = .871) and a
strong structure coefficient (r = .802) for the Victimization by Powerful Others Bias.  The two
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Table 6: Standardized Discriminant Function Coefficients
Function
1 2 3 4
Hostile Attribution Bias .295 .365 -.815 .371
Potency Bias -.212 -.170 .147 -.024
Retribution Bias .088 .360 .587 .726
Victimization by Powerful Others Bias .050 .871 .118 -.496
Social Discounting Bias .946 -.295 .175 -.165
Table 7: Structure Coefficients
Function
1 2 3 4
Social Discounting Bias .938 -.184 .198 -.170
Victimization by Powerful Others Bias .127 .802 .174 -.542
Hostile Attribution Bias .319 .315 -.744 .430
Potency Bias -.001 -.049 .113 .025
Retribution Bias .137 .344 .548 .749
Table 8: Canonical Discriminant Functions Evaluated at Group Centroids
FunctionCluster 1 2 3 4
1 -.931 -.676 .136 -.164
2 2.135 -.488 -.110 -.226
3 .390 1.103 1.890 .910
4 -.220 .642 -1.082 .812
5 -.365 2.595 -.125 -1.218
Table 9: Unstandardized Discriminant Function Coefficients
Function
1 2 3 4
Hostile Attribution Bias .448 .552 -1.234 .562
Potency Bias -.344 -.276 .239 -.038
Retribution Bias .152 .622 1.015 1.255
Victimization by Powerful Others Bias .083 1.453 .196 -.828
Social Discounting Bias 1.379 -.430 .256 -.241
CONSTANT -1.904 -1.134 -.023 -.266
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other functions are controlled by different JMs: function 3 by the Hostile Attribution Bias and
function 4 by the Retribution Bias.  Thus, four of the five justification mechanisms are
represented in the four discriminant functions.  This provides additional support for the adequacy
of the five-cluster solution.
Lastly, the participants were classified on the basis of their scores on the four functions.
The results of this classification are presented in Table 10.  These results indicated that the
typology produced by Ward’s (1963) procedure was 87% correct in its classification of subjects
to their groups (i.e., 1,339 subjects’ group membership was affirmed).  Therefore, 13% of the
sample (200 subjects) required reclassification.  These subjects were treated as “new” cases and
Table 10: Classification Results
Predicted Group Membership
Cluster 1 2 3 4 5 TOTAL
Original # 1 602 46 16 27 3 694
2 11 268 15 10 23 327
3 0 16 109 0 5 130
4 2 0 16 247 2 267
5 0 0 1 1 119 121
% 1 86.7 6.6 2.3 3.9 .4 100
2 3.4 82.0 4.6 3.1 7.0 100
3 0 12.3 83.8 0 3.8 100
4 .7 0 6.0 92.5 .7 100
5 0 0 .8 .8 98.3 100
Cross-Validated # 1 602 46 16 27 3 694
2 11 267 15 11 23 327
3 0 16 106 0 8 130
4 2 0 16 246 3 267
5 0 0 1 1 119 121
% 1 86.7 6.6 2.3 3.9 .4 100
2 3.4 81.7 4.6 3.4 7.0 100
3 0 12.3 81.5 0 6.2 100
4 .7 0 6.0 92.1 1.1 100
5 0 0 .8 .8 98.3 100
Note. 87.4% of original grouped cases were correctly classified.
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were classified to the appropriate groups until the procedure indicated that every subject was
optimally assigned to a cluster.
Structure of the Typology
Each cluster is described in terms of the distinguishing features of its members (i.e., the
scoring profiles for the individuals that reside in that cluster).  As noted, the profiles of four of
the five clusters tend to coincide with four of the five justification mechanisms that are
instrumental in rationalizing the expression of aggression.  Mean scores on each of the JMs for
each cluster reveal that the JMs seem to work independently (see Tables 11 and 12).  That is,
aggressive individuals tend to employ one JM significantly more often than the others.  Further
support for this argument of independence can be seen in the fact that the justification
mechanisms are not highly correlated (see Table 13).  The results were not enough to justify
arguing that individuals utilize one and only one JM, but they do seem to indicate that there is a
tendency for most aggressive individuals to favor the use of one specific justification mechanism
to rationalize their aggressive behaviors.
Cluster 1: Nonaggressive individuals.  It was important for this cluster to encompass the
majority of the sample because prior validity studies of the CRT-A (James et al., 2004, 2005)
have demonstrated that there is a low base-rate for high scores on the measure (e.g., 12-15%).
Consistent with this notion, this cluster consisted of 45% of the sample (n = 694).  The overall
mean score on the CRT-A for this cluster was nearly 3/4 of a standard deviation lower than the
overall mean score for the entire sample.  Their scores on each of the JMs were also significantly
lower than the mean scores for the entire sample.
Cluster 2: Social discounting bias. This cluster, comprising approximately 21% of the
sample (n = 327), consists of aggressive individuals (mean score on CRT-A = 5.25) who tended
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Table 11: Cluster Mean Scores and Standard Deviations on Justification Mechanisms










Aggressive 694 .647 / .680 .273 / .449 .370 / .486 .333 / .481 .447 / .609
(2) Social
Discounting 327 2.57 / .714 .449 / .648 1.16 / .923 .651 / .822 .422 / .678
(3) Retribution 130 1.38 / .968 1.75 / .648 .461 / .531 1.12 / .737 .531 / .612
(4) Hostile
Attribution 267 .659 / .498 .629 / .742 1.67 / .616 .577 / .517 .337 / .599
(5) Victim
Powerful Others 121 .686 / .633 .429 / .545 1.00 / .866 2.26 / .496 .314 / .500
Table 12: Overall Cluster Mean Scores and Standard Deviations
Cluster n Overall Justification Mechanism Score (M / SD)
(1) Not
Aggressive 694 2.07 / 1.40
(2) Social
Discounting 327 5.25 / 1.99
(3) Retribution 130 5.25 / 1.71
(4) Hostile
Attribution 267 3.87 / 1.50
(5) Victim
Powerful Others 121 4.69 / 1.60
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Table 13: Correlations Between Scores on Justification Mechanisms
Justification Mechanism 1 2 3 4 5
n = 1,539
1. Hostile Attribution -
2. Potency  .088** -
3. Retribution  .083** .090* -
4. Victimization by
Powerful Others .071* .050* .112** -
5. Social Discounting .159* .111* .101** .092* -
Note. **p < .01  *p < .05
to endorse the aggressive response option on those items designed to appeal to individuals that
possess the Social Discounting Bias.  These individuals tend to interpret and analyze social
norms as restricting their free will, which in turn promotes reactionary feelings that justify
socially deviant behaviors as ways to exercise their right to freedom of expression.
Cluster 3: Retribution bias. This cluster constitutes about 8% of the sample (n = 130).
These individuals appear to rely most frequently on the Retribution Bias to justify their
unconscious predilection toward retaliatory responses to situations that entail challenged self-
esteem or potential loss of honor, pride, and/or respect.
Cluster 4: Hostile attribution bias.  The fourth type, constituting 17% of the sample (n =
267), is individuals that have a propensity to see malevolent intent in the actions of others.  This
group is predisposed to employ the Hostile Attribution Bias as a means of rationalizing the
appeal of self-defense (and thus aggressive behavior, as a way to ensure self-defense).
Cluster 5: Victimization by powerful others bias. This cluster is comprised of
approximately 8% of the sample (n = 121).  The Victimization by Powerful Others Bias
underlies much of the justification for these individuals’ aggressive actions.  They are
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predisposed to see the actions of powerful others as causes of inequity and attempts at
exploitation.  This generates rationalizations that aggressive behavior is permissible as it is a
legitimate strike against oppression and a means to correct prejudice and injustice that is
engendered by powerful others.
Alternative cluster solutions were examined to determine if there was perhaps a better fit
with a different solution.  Inspection of three-, four-, six-, and seven-cluster solutions that were
obtained via the same data analytic process described above indicated that the five-cluster
solution provided the optimal representation of the typology.  The alternative solutions did not
satisfy all of the statistical criteria for an acceptable cluster solution.  Furthermore, the three-,
four-, and six-cluster solutions were simply variants of the five-cluster solution.  The only
difference was the point at which each group was divided.  For example, the six-cluster solution
contained the exact same four clusters (same individuals, same size) represented by the four
previously noted JMs, but the cluster of non-aggressive individuals (Cluster 1) was divided into
two clusters.  Lastly, the groups in the three- and four-cluster solutions overlapped too much





Analyses revealed a typology of the major component of the implicit aggressive
personality that, in meeting the demands of established statistical criteria, appears to be valid and
reliable.  The typology now provides the field of personality with a significant first step towards
the establishment of a systematic framework for organizing the focal components underlying the
unconscious aggressive personality.
It appears that those individuals who score high on the CRT-A (i.e., receive an
“aggressive” score) tend to arrive at their high scores via simple pathways that are defined by the
justification mechanism (JM) that each person tends to rely on to rationalize their aggressive
behavior.  This suggests that specific justification mechanisms are employed as a function of
cluster membership.  It also suggests that the justification mechanisms tend to operate
independently.  An implication of this last point is the fact that an individual’s score on one JM
cannot be used to predict their score on another.
Two auxiliary noteworthy findings emerged during examination of the cluster solution.
First, the Potency Bias is not represented anywhere in the typology.  The aggressive subjects did
endorse the responses designed to measure this justification mechanism.  It just appears that they
did not do so with enough frequency for the JM to be represented in any of the five types.  Does
this indicate that the Potency Bias does not play an active role in the unconscious personality of
aggressive individuals?  The answer is very likely no.  In fact, the discriminant function
produced by the Potency Bias in the six-cluster solution was significant; it simply did not
provide enough explanatory power to justify keeping it.  Questions regarding the role of the
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Potency Bias in the implicit aggressive personality need to be considered in subsequent
investigations.
The second noteworthy finding is the fact that the third cluster and the fifth cluster were
both relatively small in size.  This suggests that the justification mechanisms that characterize
each group (Retribution Bias and Victimization by Powerful Others Bias, respectively) do not
play as important an overall role as the Social Discounting Bias or the Hostile Attribution Bias.
This might indicate that the latter two JMs serve more prevalent roles in aggressive individual’s
rationalization processes.  Further exploration of this issue is needed.
Implications of the Typology
The typology has important implications for both scientists and practitioners.  The first
notable implication concerns theory development.  Theoretical considerations of the unconscious
personality have waned when compared to the considerable work that has been done and
continues to be done on the explicit (conscious) personality.  The Conditional Reasoning
Measurement System (James, 1998) opens up an abundance of opportunities for theory
development and testing in the domain of the implicit (unconscious) personality.  It is hoped that
the CRT-A is only the beginning of a long line of implicit measures of latent personality
constructs.  As more measures are developed, additional typologies can be developed as well.
The concept of justification mechanisms is still relatively brand new in the field of
personality psychology.  This highlights the importance of using the current research as a basis
for developing theory and establishing unifying themes (if indeed any exist) that tie these
apparently disparate concepts together.
The typology also has direct implications for intervention/early identification, both in the
clinical domain and the organizational/work domain.  The unique clusters suggest that an
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intervention designed for one type of aggressive individual (e.g., one who primarily employs the
Social Discounting Bias) might not be effective for another (e.g., one who predominantly utilizes
the Victimization by Powerful Others Bias).  That is, although specific dimensions may be
important points of intervention for some, they are likely less important for others.
There are also salient implications for individuals’ total scores on the CRT-A.  Low (e.g.,
zero to two) and moderate (e.g., three to six) overall scores on the CRT-A indicate that JMs are
not instrumental or are only sporadically instrumental in shaping and guiding reasoning.  These
people tend to lack a significant implicit readiness to engage in aggressive behaviors and are
therefore not as likely to engage in these types of behaviors.  Research supports this contention
(James et al., 2004, 2005).  Results from this study support the argument as well, indicating that
the majority of these individuals fell into the first cluster (Nonaggressives).
High overall scores on the CRT-A (e.g., seven and above) suggest that individuals utilize
justification mechanisms to reason in ways that permit them to engage in aggressive behaviors
without seeing their actions as illogical or inappropriate.  Research (James et al., 2004, 2005)
indicates that these people have the highest probability of acting aggressively.  The current
research suggests that these individuals achieved their scores mainly via high scores on one JM
(e.g., five or six) and a moderate score (e.g., one or two) on another JM.  This provides validity
to the arguments of Laughlin (1963) and Weinberger (1998), who maintained that defense
mechanisms often operate in concert and through an innumerable variety of patterns.  It also
implies that James and colleagues were on the right track when theorizing about the operation of
justification mechanisms.  Burroughs and James (2005) posited, “several of the justification
mechanisms may operate in unison, such as the hostile attribution bias and the victimization by
powerful others bias” (p. 134).
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Thus, while these researchers seem to be partially correct in their theorizing, their
arguments should likely be amended based on what was found here.  One defense mechanism or
justification mechanism appears to act as the principal justifier, while others seem to play more
minor roles in guiding the reasoning of aggressive individuals.
Limitations
The limitations associated with the primary data analytic technique used to develop the
typology (i.e., cluster analysis) have been noted since the advent of the methodology.  Cluster
analysis has been criticized as intractable by a number of prominent research methodologists and
statisticians (see Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984; Milligan & Cooper, 1987; Gordon, 1999, for
overviews of these criticisms).  Nonetheless, the purpose of this endeavor was to explore an area
in which no substantial theory has been developed and which it is hoped new theory will be
developed soon.  Given the available methods, cluster analysis was deemed most appropriate.
Another limitation is that the typology might vary if applied to a wider spectrum of aggressive
individuals or to aggressive individuals differing in sociodemographic characteristics.
Directions for Future Research
Since the current research was designed to be an exploratory investigation into the
possible structure of the implicit aggressive personality, there are a myriad of areas in which
research on this topic may proceed.  Firstly, replication is imperative.  New samples need to
complete the CRT-A as well as be measured on valid aggression-related criteria.  Concurrent
validity studies then need to be conducted to measure the extent to which the typology accurately
classifies aggressive individuals.
As noted in the previous section, after the typology is successfully replicated and
potentially refined, future work can delve into the task of using it as a classification system for
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the identification of aggressive individuals.  Improved discriminant functions can be developed
for the purpose of identifying which group an individual might reside based on their scoring
profile on the CRT-A.
In closing, meaningful replications and extensions are now possible and are especially
necessary.  Perhaps the typology will not hold up when used with a different sample, or perhaps
the implicit aggressive personality is more complicated than a parsimonious five-cluster
typology.  The exhaustiveness of the typology is thus still to be determined.  A final issue to
consider is this: How likely are the clusters to be replicated in other well-established aggression
inventories?  These are all questions that need to be addressed in future research endeavors
involving the CRT-A.  Much work remains to be done before any real conclusions can be drawn.
Conclusion
The typology presented here indicates a rather simple mechanism for the manner in
which implicit biases affect the reasoning processes of aggressive individuals.   In short, the
development of the typology began with a theory rooted in the concept of justification
mechanisms.  The resulting product was essentially the same theory regarding justification
mechanisms: JMs tend to operate independently while they unconsciously shape the reasoning of
aggressive individuals by enhancing the rational appeal of aggression.
It is hoped that the empirically derived typology in the current paper provides a
systematic and relatively comprehensive framework for classifying the major component parts of
the implicit aggressive personality.  While drawn from the results of only one study and only
four samples, the structure of the typology suggests that researchers should remain optimistic
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